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COMMENTS
Post-Moresi Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1903, Louisiana courts have allowed recovery for a wide variety of
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, but the development of this cause
of action has been ad hoc and has followed no unifying principles.' In 1990,
the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Moresi v. State Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries and held that Louisiana recognizes a cause of action for negligent
infliction of mental disturbance without accompanying physical injury so long
as there is an "especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress." 2 For
the first time, there was a formula that could apply to any fact pattern to
determine whether a plaintiff might have a claim under this cause of action.
Therefore, Moresi prescribed a general rule for negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED).3
Earlier in 1990, the same court had already adopted a rule providing the
remedy for "bystander" recovery for NIED in Lejeune v. Rayne Branch
Hospital.4 A bystander was defined as someone who suffered pain and anguish
due to injury to a third party.5 Recovery was limited to those who viewed the
injury causing event or came upon the scene soon thereafter and before the
victim's condition had changed substantially.6 The emotional distress had to be
serious and reasonably foreseeable, based largely on the severity and manner of
harm suffered by the trauma victim.7 And finally, the bystander had to be
closely related to the trauma victim!
In 1991, largely as a result of Lejeune, the Louisiana Legislature
passed Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6." This article fixed the requisite
relational proximity requirement between the plaintiff and the trauma
victim, dropped the requirement that the distress victim come upon the
scene before substantial change in the trauma victim's condition, and
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Graham v. Western Union, 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) (this case involved the
negligent transmission of a death message); Moresi v. State Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So.
2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990). See also Cullen J. Dupuy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
The Effect of Article 2315.6, 53 La. L. Rev. 555, 560-61 (1992).
2. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096.
3. Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 5-8, at 124 & n.1 17
(1996).
4. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
5. Id. at 570.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Dupuy, supra note 1, at 578.
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provided that bystander recovery was possible "only in accordance with this
[a]rticle."'
Since then, Louisiana has observed a jurisprudential rule of law granting an
independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress subject
to a positive law exception governing bystander recovery. One can easily
imagine a factual situation that would constitute a valid cause of action under
Moresi, but in which recovery would be denied due to its failure to meet the
requisites of bystander recovery under Article 2315.6." In the abstract it is
perfectly proper and customary to have specific exceptions to general rules of
law. However, where the policies behind each are in conflict and where the
results can seem unreasonably incongruous, the principle containing the smallest
benefit to public policy should give way and/or new rules should be developed.
For example, a hypothetical step-mother visits her comatose step-son in the
hospital and observes that he has recently suffered multiple rodent bites about his
head and body, 2 it would appear that Article 2315.6 would create an arbitrary
barrier to her recovery for mental anguish negligently inflicted by the hospital.
Clearly, the Moresi test is satisfied, as there is an "especial likelihood of genuine
and serious mental distress" arising from circumstances guaranteeing the claim
is not spurious. Yet, such a distress victim would fail to state a cause of action
given that bystander recovery is exclusively governed by Article 2315.6 that
denies recovery to step-parents. 3
The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of NIED as a
cause of action in Louisiana. To this end, it will assess the impact of Moresi and
evaluate the policies underlying both the NIED general rule and the Article
2315.6 exception in order to suggest their proper relationship. Additionally, this
article will seek to determine whether bystander recovery per Article 2315.6 is
in fact the exclusive remedy if the distress victim can establish that the negligent
tortfeasor owed an independent, direct duty of care to protect against such
emotional distress, notwithstanding that the bystander otherwise invokes Article
2315.6. First, to better understand the context of this comment, a brief
examination of the development of NIED as a cause of action under the common
law is in order.
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER THE COMMON
LAW
Prosser and Keeton divide NIED into three general categories: mental
disturbance alone, mental disturbance with physical injury, and mental
10. La. Civ. Code art 2315.6. See infra note 58.
11. See infra text accompanying note 13.
12. This hypothetical is a hybrid of the facts of two cases: Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp.,
556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990) and Daigrepont v. La. State Racing Comm'n, 663 So. 2d 840 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 1085 (1996).
13. See infra note 156.
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disturbance with physical injury to another. 4 Additionally, they address NIED
as an independent cause of action.'5
A. Mental Disturbance Alone
A great majority of courts deny recovery where the defendant's negligence
causes mental distress unaccompanied by physical injury, illness, or other
physical consequences, and where there is no other basis for tort liability.'
6
Over the last hundred years or so, two groups of cases have developed into
exceptions to this general rule-against telegraph companies for negligent
transmission of death messages and against defendants who negligently mishandle
corpses."' While mental disturbance alone will only infrequently be a serious
wrong worthy of redress, where the severity is sufficiently attested by the
circumstances of the case, recovery is proper. 8 Thus, according to Prosser and
Keeton, recovery should not be limited to the two types of cases listed above, but
should extend to other cases whose facts suggest that the distress is real and
serious."' Generally, what these cases will "have in common is an especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special
circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spuri-
ous.
20
Professors Maraist and Galligan suggest that requiring an especial
likelihood of mental distress serves to avoid opening the litigation
floodgates and to deter fraudulent claims.2' The requirement also has the effect
of conserving judicial resources such as time and effort by avoiding many
difficult cause-in-fact decisions that are also particularly subject to erroneous
disposition.22
B. Mental Disturbance with Physical Injury
Where the defendant's negligence causes physical injury, courts have
historically allowed compensation for the purely mental elements accompanying
it-fright, apprehension, nervousness, and humiliation are common examples.
23
14. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at 361-67 (5th ed.
1984). "Emotional distress" and "mental disturbance" and "mental anguish" will be used
interchangeably.
15. Id. at 364-65.
16. Id. at 361.
17. Id. at 362. See cases cited in Moresi v. State Dep "t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d
1081, 1096 (La. 1990).
18. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 362.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 125.
22. Id.
23. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 362-63.
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These are called "parasitic damages." 24 In these cases, the physical harm
serves as the guarantee that the mental injury is genuine and not
feigned. 5
Some jurisdictions require physical impact upon the plaintiff's person.26
In addition to "untenable notions of causal connection, the theory appears
to be that the 'impact' affords the desired guarantee that the mental distur-
bance is genuine." 27  However, because it is possible to assure genuine
mental disturbance when the plaintiff escapes impact by only an inch,
substantial justice can be served without reliance upon the impact doc-
trine.28  As a result, most courts have repudiated the requirement of
impact and regard as sufficient that the distress be certified by some
physical manifestation.29
C. Mental Disturbance with Physical Injury to Another
Until recently, most courts denied recovery where the mental disturbance
was not caused by the plaintiff's fear for his own safety, but by distress at
witnessing physical injury to another.30 Obviously, any court adhering to the
impact doctrine did so because there has been no physical impact upon the
plaintiff's person.3 Other courts deny recovery because they find the defendant
owed the plaintiff no duty of care since it was unforeseeable that the plaintiff
would suffer any harm as a result of the defendant's conduct.32 However, many
courts allow bystander recovery when the plaintiff was personally within the
zone of danger.33 In these situations, courts find that the defendant owes a duty
of care to the plaintiff who narrowly escapes physical injury but suffers
emotional distress by witnessing the physical injury which befalls the trauma
victim-in the classic case a mother observing the death of her child.34 The
seminal English case which American courts have followed, Hambrook v. Stokes
Brothers, involved just such an accident.33 Due to the defendant's negligence
in driving a vehicle into the plaintiffs path, she was herself threatened
with physical harm but only suffered mental harm through fright at the
peril to her child.36 The court held that "with an initial breach of duty
24. Id. See Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 124.
25. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 363.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 364.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 365.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 366.
35. [1925] 1 K. B. 141.
36. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 365.
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
to her established, it becomes merely a matter of the unexpected manner
in which the foreseeable harm has occurred, so that recovery should be
allowed.""
That the plaintiff herself must be in some foreseeable danger may be an
artificial and arbitrary requisite for recovery given that such a plaintiff not in the
zone of danger but somewhere in the vicinity may suffer mental distress every
bit as serious." As a result, some courts have allowed recovery to
bystanders suffering mental distress at witnessing trauma negligently inflicted
on others from positions of complete safety. 9 This theory, known as the
bystander proximity doctrine, was developed in the California Supreme
Court in the 1968 case, Dillon v. Legg.4 ° In essence, the doctrine stands
for the proposition that the bystander may be foreseeable, and, therefore, owed
a duty of care if there exists physical, temporal, and relational proximity between
the plaintiff bystander and the scene, the accident, and the trauma victim
respectively.4 '
D. NIED as an Independent Cause of Action
At least two states "have taken the final step and permitted a general
negligence cause of action for the infliction of serious emotional distress"
without regard to whether the plaintiff or any other person suffered
physical injury or illness as a result.42 This approach remains in the
minority as most courts disfavor it.43 Reluctance to "take the final step"
stems from the same concerns that have dominated the tumultuous
development of NIED generally: fear of compensating for trivial or
temporary harm, fear of false claims, and perceived unfairness of burdening
a negligent defendant for consequences somewhat remote from the
wrongful act." While real, these problems can be met by requiring
objective proof of injury, requiring some guarantee of genuineness, and by
asking if fairness will permit leaving the burden of loss upon the innocent
victim.45
37. Id.
38. Id. at 366.
39. Id.
40. 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968). The plaintiff [mother] witnessed the defendant's
automobile negligently strike and kill one daughter and narrowly miss another as the children were
crossing the street. The guidelines established by this case to govern bystander NIED were later
converted into fixed rules of law. See infra text accompanying note 81.
41. Id.
42. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 364-65.
43. See id. at n.55 for a list of cases representing some of such courts: Massachusetts,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Maine, Mississippi, Oregon, and Colorado.
44. Id. at 360-61.
45. Id. at 361.
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III. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN THE LOUISIANA
JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW
4 6
A. Bystander Proximity Doctrine
An 1855 Louisiana Supreme Court case47 established a no recovery rule in
Louisiana bystander NIED actions that largely remained intact until its 1990
reversal in Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital.48 In Lejeune, the distress victim
was a wife who visited her comatose husband, the third party trauma victim,
soon after he had been severely bitten by rodents while in the defendant
hospital's care.49 She observed that his face was covered with holes and was
told by a nurse that they were caused by rat bites."0 The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial and appellate court findings that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action." While the court purposely did not decide the proximity of relationship
between the trauma and distress victims necessary to, allow the plaintiff to
recover, 2 it did establish four guidelines to limit recovery so as to avoid the
potential administrative nightmare that could result from opening the litigation
floodgates too wide:
1) The claimant must either view the accident or injury-causing
event or come upon the scene soon thereafter and before substantial
changes occur in the victim's condition.
2) The trauma victim must suffer such harm that it can reasonably
be expected that one in the plaintiff's position would suffer serious
mental anguish from the experience.
3) The emotional distress must have been both serious and
reasonably foreseeable and it must also be both severe and debilitating.
46. This comment will not address parasitic disturbance, the impact rule, or the zone of danger
rule under Louisiana law.
I. Parasitic disturbance: These damages are awarded so frequently by every jurisdiction as to be
regarded as a settled area of the law. This is largely because "with a cause of action established by
the physical harm ... it is considered that there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not
feigned." Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 363; see also Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3,
§ 5-8, at 124.
2. Impact rule: Louisiana does not require "impact" upon the plaintiff's person as do many
common law jurisdictions. Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 124; Lejeune v. Rayne
Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 564 (La. 1990).
3. Zone of danger rule: This rule is not applicable in Louisiana because it is merely "another way
of saying that the wrongful conduct was directed at both the trauma victim and the mental anguish
victim, or it is a proxy for the '[e]special likelihood' of mental distress test adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Moresi." Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 126.
47. Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
48. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 569.
49. Id. at 561-62.
50. Id. at 562.
51. Id. at 571.
52. Id. at 570-71. The court concluded that a spouse would satisfy any appropriate standard.
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4) The claimant must have a close relationship with the trauma
victim.53
Later in 1990, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, decided
Clomon v. Monroe City School Board which held that where the defendant owed
the bystander an independent statutory duty which encompassed the duty to
protect against the risk of mental distress, the plaintiff need not satisfy any pre-
accident relationship test with the trauma victim in order to state a cause of
action. 4 Therefore, the statutory duty rendered Lejeune inapplicable. 55
However, another rationale for this conclusion was raised in Justice Hall's
concurrence. Simply put, Justice Hall found Lejeune inapplicable because
Clomon, the plaintiff, was a participant in the accident and not a mere bystander,
and because her distress resulted from having been involved in a traumatic ordeal
and not from witnessing the event. 56 The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal adopted this rationale in deciding Guillory v. Arceneaux which involved
an accident in which a trauma victim unrelated to the claimant was killed partly
because of the defendant's negligence." Though the claimant was unrelated to
the deceased and suffered no physical injury, the court allowed recovery because
Guillory participated in the accident as driver of the car that struck and killed the
deceased who had been negligently placed on the road by the defendant's
conduct.5"
. Against the backdrop of Lejeune, Clomon, and Guillory, the Louisiana
Legislature, in 1991, adopted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6. 9 While
53. Id. at 570.
54. 572 So. 2d 571, 575-76 (La. 1990). The plaintiff's automobile struck and killed a four-year
old school boy. He had entered her path after the bus driver and bus attendant discharged him from
the bus, deactivated the warning device prematurely, and drove away, leaving the victim to cross the
street alone.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 579 (Hall, J., concurring).
57. 580 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 587 So. 2d 694 (La. 1991).
58. Id. at 997.
59. A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person, or
who come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter, may recover damages for
mental anguish or emotional distress that they suffer as a result of the other
person's injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the injured
person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of
the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or any of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person, or either of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this Article, the injured
person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant's
position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience,
and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress must be severe, debilitat-
ing, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result of mental anguish or emotional
1999]
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Article 2315.6 largely codified Lejeune, there are two substantial differences.
First, under Article 2315.6 the plaintiff must either view the accident or come
upon the scene soon thereafter, but he need not do so before substantial change
occurs in the victim's condition as was required under Lejeune.6 ° Secondly, the
legislature drew a bright line in establishing the relationship required between the
distress and trauma victims.6 ' The list of beneficiaries under Article 2315.6 is
broader than those allowed in wrongful death or survival actions.62 Article
2315.6 does not preempt by class, so multiple plaintiffs may all recover if they
otherwise satisfy the article, despite the fact that they represent more than one
of the recognized classes of beneficiaries.63
Additionally, although there was some debate over the matter, the better
view is that rather than overruling Clomon and Guillory, Article 2315.6 does not
apply to these cases because the plaintiffs were not bystanders, but actual
accident participants owed an independent duty of care by the defendants to
protect against such mental distress as was inflicted." Thus, bystander recovery
in Louisiana is best understood by analysis of both Lejeune, since it represents
a jurisprudential NIED bystander rule,65 and of Article 2315.6, the legislative
adoption of that rule.66
One cannot consider the meaning and scope of Article 2315.6 without first
reviewing Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and the ancient civilian principles
for which it stands: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Simply put, this funda-
mental civil law principle has been a basic tenet of Louisiana tort law since 1808
and it "represents the very foundation upon which all tort law in Louisiana has
been constructed .... 67 "The general tenor of Article 2315, creating a cause
of action in favor of injured parties against those by whose fault the injury
happened, makes that article universal in its operation unless a specific exception
is established by law., 6' Thus, absent a statutory directive or a compelling
public interest, the courts should recognize no exceptions. Read in pari materia
with Article 2315,69 Article 2315.6 prescribes just such a limitation on the
distress for injury to another shall be recovered only in accordance with this
Article.
La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
60. Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 129.
61. Id. at 130.
62. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1 for survival action beneficiaries and La. Civ. Code art.
2315.2 for wrongful death action beneficiaries. Neither includes grandparents as does Article 2315.6.
63. See supra note 59.
64. Dupuy, supra note 1, at 578-79.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
66. See supra text accompanying note 9.
67. Hightower v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 117 So. 2d 642, 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
68. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 122, 125 (La. 1965).
69. It is necessary to read Article 2315.6 in par! materia with Article 2315 or there would be
no fault requirement since Article 2315.6 does not address fault.
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application of the general rule and thus represents a statutory exception based on
a superseding societal policy 70-the need to limit liability exposure and
fraudulent claims.7
The most fundamental basis of this societal policy is that there must be
limits on recovery for bystander mental distress victims given that "[i]t would be
an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has
endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of
every other person disturbed by reason of it. ... ."" In the bystander context,
the danger of fictitious claims and the necessity of guarantees of genuineness are
even greater than in other NIED scenarios."
Therefore, to allow for bystander recovery as required by its civil law
heritage while simultaneously limiting it in an effort to maintain a proper
balance, the Louisiana Supreme Court developed the Lejeune guidelines which,
as was noted earlier, were largely codified by Article 2315.6."' Thus, Article
2315.6 represents Louisiana's adaptationof the bystander proximity doctrine first
espoused in 1968 by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg." It is
designed to allow redress of genuine bystander emotional distress while not
opening the litigation floodgates too far.
76
However, in 1989, Dillon was modified by Thing v. La Chusa." Thing
provided the Louisiana Legislature with an updated analysis of NIED bystander
recovery, and Louisiana borrowed heavily from the California experience in
selecting the language with which to codify Lejeune.h
The Dillon proximity doctrine was intended to assist California courts in
determining whether emotional distress injuries were reasonably foreseeable. 79
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court "enunciated 'guidelines' that suggested
a limitation on the action to circumstances like those in the case before it": 0
First, whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; second,
whether the distress resulted from the plaintiffs sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident; and third, whether the plaintiff and the trauma victim
were closely related.8' However, in Thing, the court acknowledged that the
guidelines had resulted in a "'case-to-case' or ad hoc approach to development
of the law that ... has not only produced inconsistent rulings in the lower
courts, but has provoked considerable critical comment by scholars who attempt
70. Dupuy, supra note 1, at 574.
71. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 569 (La. 1990).
72. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 366.
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
75. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 564-66.
76. Id. at 566.
77. 771 P.2d 814 (Ca. 1989).
78. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 565.
79. Thing, 771 P.2d at 820.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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to reconcile the cases. ' 2 In an effort to define the parameters of bystander
recovery and to "avoid[ ] the limitless exposure to liability that the pure
foreseeability test of 'duty' would create" as evidenced by the post-Dillon
decisions, 3 the court converted the Dillon guidelines into fixed rules of law. 4
It is clear that when Louisiana codified Article 2315.6, the Legislature was
not only mindful of its own desire to limit liability under the article, 5 but also
of California's twenty-year experiment during which bystander NIED cases were
unsatisfactorily governed by a general rule of recovery premised on foreseeabili-
ty.s6 Thus, Article 2315.6 was designed to preclude limitless exposure and to
promote uniform decisions.8 In short, the Legislature sought to accomplish
these goals by establishing that, as a matter of law, a tortfeasor owes a duty of
care to protect a bystander from mental anguish occasioned by observance of an
injury to a third party only if the requirements of Article 2315.6 are met.
B. NIED as an Independent Cause of Action
As a result of both common law influence and its civil law heritage,
Louisiana has deviated from the general common law rule of denying recovery
for emotional distress without physical injury in cases that indicate on their face
the potential for mental distress.88 Like the common law, these cases include
negligent transmission of death messages by telegraph companies and negligent
mishandling of corpses.8 9 Other situations, however, have also triggered the
theory: failure to install, maintain, or repair consumer products; failure to take
photographs or develop film; negligent property damage witnessed by the owner;
and where the plaintiff was in great fear for his personal safety.9 Obviously,
these claims will be heavily fact specific such that the court is assured of the
harm's severity and genuineness.
Because the court in Moresi concluded that "the plaintiff's mental
disturbance was not severe, or related to personal injury or property damage, and
[that] the plaintiffs were not in great fear for their personal safety," it disallowed
the NIED claim.9 As a result, the particular facts of Moresi are relatively
82. Id. at 825.
83. Id. at 821.
84. Id. at 829-30. Bystander NIED recovery was limited to those circumstances where the
plaintiff: "(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury
producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3)
as a result suffers serious emotional distress .... " Id. at 829-30.
85. Dupuy, supra note 1, at 569-70.
86. See supra note 75.
87. See supra text accompanying note 82.
88. Moresi v. State Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Two months after two of the plaintiffs were arrested for failure to properly tag taken
ducks, state game agents mistakenly left a message intended for someone else on the plaintiff's
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unimportant except as an indicator of how high the court has placed the bar for
NIED claims. But the test adopted by the court to assess the NIED claim is of
tremendous significance. Basically, Justice Dennis, in writing for the Moresi
court, adopted "wholesale" the language of Prosser and Keeton in holding that
NIED claims, in order to be actionable, must have an "especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances,
which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious."92 The court then
disposed of the Moresi NIED claim since it did "not fall within any category
having an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, and thus,
lack[ed] any recognized elements guaranteeing the genuineness of the injury
claimed."93  In so doing, the Supreme Court established a general rule
governing NIED claims and thereby moved Louisiana into the company of
a distinct minority of states that recognize NIED as an independent cause
of action.94
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Moresi Applied to Recently Developed Categories of NIED Claims
As stated earlier, there seem to be only two categories of NIED
claims: 1) those where the defendant's negligence is aimed qat a third
person trauma victim, but the plaintiff suffers mental anguish as a result
(bystander cases), and 2) by default, all other cases.95 The former must
satisfy Article 2315.6 to be valid, the latter, Moresi. Recall that Moresi
comprises a jurisprudential rule based on Article 2315, prior case law, and
upon the need to serve the societal interest of denying spurious NIED
claims.96 Perhaps the significance of Moresi is best illustrated by the
emergence of two categories of cases. The first is where the defendant's
negligent conduct exposes the victim to a realistic fear of contracting a
deadly disease such as cancer or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)-phobia cases. The second category, perhaps more properly
considered as a subset of the first, is where the defendant breaches a duty
owed to the plaintiff to prevent the exposure to a deadly disease by way
of a third person--channel cases.
camphouse door. The message read: "We missed you this time but look out next time." Moresi,
567 So. 2d at 1096.
92. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096; Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 362.
93. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096.
94. See supra text accompanying note 42.
95. Dupuy, supra note 1, at 566; see supra text accompanying note 11.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 88-96.
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1. Phobia Cases
The third circuit considered an AIDS phobia case in Bordelon v. St. Frances
Cabrini.97 This was a case in which a hospital negligently gave a patient
someone else's blood during surgery. The plaintiff subsequently "suffered severe
emotional anguish about the possibility of contracting AIDS."98 The court held
that the plaintiff stated a valid cause of action for NIED,99 but it did so after
applying a duty-risk analysis and without relying directly upon Moresi.'" The
court recognized that "[a]ny recovery for mental anguish tort damages must be
based on La. Civil Code article 2315 .... The duty-risk analysis is used to
assist our courts in determining whether one may recover under article
2315. ,,lI
However, the spirit, if not the letter, of Moresi guided the court such that its
decision would undoubtedly satisfy the requirement that the circumstances serve
as a guarantee that the claim was not spurious and that the harm was both severe
and genuine. This was done through a careful inquiry into the risk and resulting
harm suffered by the plaintiff relative to the scope of the hospital's duty to
prevent such harm. °2 Since the plaintiff's mental anguish was easily associat-
ed with the defendant's negligent conduct in giving her someone else's blood,
an inquiry that was heavily fact specific, the risk and resulting harm were within
the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached.'0 3 In fact, the court
concluded that under the particular circumstances, it was foreseeable that the
plaintiff could develop a genuine and reasonable fear of contracting AIDS.'0 '
The court's ultimate conclusion that plaintiff's fear could be reasonable despite
her failure to allege that the blood administered to her*was in fact contaminated
with AIDS is suspect and inconsistent with that court's later handling of channel
cases as will be discussed below.'0 5 While the court probably would have
reached the same result, its failure to explicitly invoke the Moresi test suggests
that at least one circuit does not regard Moresi as the test by which non-
bystander NIED claims must be measured.
In 1993 the Fifth Circuit considered a phobia case in Straughan v.
Ahmed."0 6 In this case, however, the court expressly evaluated the claim of
97. 640 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
98. Id. at 477.
99. Id. at 479.
100. Id. at 478.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 479.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 477-78.
106. 618 So. 2d 1225 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 625 So. 2d 1033 (1993). The defendant
doctor negligently failed to follow up after discovering a lump in plaintiff's right breast. Plaintiff
was diagnosed with breast cancer two years later. The plaintiff recovered $40,000.
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cancer phobia under the Moresi test.'0 7 Specifically, it found that the plain-
tiff's cancer phobia had developed due to physician negligence.'0 ° The court
held that the NIED damages were recoverable because there existed an "especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress ... guarantee[ing] that the
claim [was] not spurious. 10 9
2. Channel Cases
The fourth circuit applied the Moresi NIED test in Vallery v. Southern
Baptist Hospital, a case in which a hospital failed to advise the plaintiff that in
the performance of his security guard duties he would restrain a patient infected
with AIDS."0 Despite the fact this patient bled on Vallery,. the hospital did
not tell him of his possible exposure to the virus until the next day."' Though
the worker compensation exclusive remedy provision barred Vallery's tort claim
against the hospital,' 2 because Vallery had sexual relations with his wife after
possible exposure to AIDS but prior to the hospital's warning to that effect, Mrs.
Vallery brought an action in NIED. 3 Because the alleged damages were
particular to Mrs. Vallery, this claim was not subject to the worker's compensa-
tion statute. 4 The court wrote that "[a] case in which a plaintiff alleges (and
subsequently proves) a genuine and reasonable fear of contracting an incurable
and fatal disease meets the Moresi requirements."' Clinical diagnosis of the
disease in the plaintiff is not necessary to prove the NIED claim." 6 The
plaintiff must prove that the deadly instrumentality, the virus, was present, that
the third party was exposed to it, and that there was an additional channel of
exposure from the third party to the plaintiff. While fear may be genuine
without a channel, requiring a channel serves to ensure the fear is also reasonable
and "far more than a speculative worry" and also serves to prevent a "flood of
ill-justified litigation."' '17
In another factually similar channel case involving the Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus (HIV) and/or Hepatitis B, the third circuit in Stewart v. St.
Frances Cabrini Hospital relied upon Vallery to deny recovery."' The court
held that where the plaintiff failed to allege the needle was contaminated with
any infectious disease, or that there was a channel of infection running to her
107. Id. at 1229.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 630 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (1994).
111. Id. at 862-63.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Id. at 866.
114. Id. at 865.
115. Id. at 866.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 867.
118. 698 So. 2d I (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
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from her spouse who had been stuck by the needle, the complaint was insuffi-
cient for want of reasonable factual basis for the claim of MED. 9 Reversing
the trial court's denial of the defendant's peremptory exceptions and remanding
to allow the plaintiff to amend her petition and state a valid cause of action, the
appellate court recognized the plaintiffs fear as genuine, but stated that "not
every fear is compensable" and that hers was "steeped in speculation." 120
In Boutin v. Oakwood Village Nursing Home, the third circuit held that the
plaintiffs failed to allege or demonstrate a channel for bacterial infection from
the nursing home resident and thus the complaint was insufficient under the
Vallery test.' 2' Since contact with the resident's infected sores or body fluids
was required to transmit the infection to the plaintiffs, and because the plaintiffs
neither alleged nor proved such contact, the trial court's dismissal was
upheld."22
Under the Moresi test, then, Louisiana appellate courts will award damages
for phobia and channel cases when "there are special circumstances that
guarantee that the claim is not spurious."' 3 As evidenced by Stewart and
Boutin, however, it is fair to say that these courts will deny recovery where
Moresi is not satisfied.'24 Thus, perhaps it is fair to say that the Moresi
decision provides adequate guidance to courts in deciding whether new categories
of cases "have ... an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental
distress" '125 such that recovery under Article 2315 can be allowed without fear
of opening the litigation floodgates to spurious claims.
B. The Proper Interpretation of Article 2315.6
In the preceding channel cases, courts applied Moresi to NIED causes of
action when the defendant's misconduct was not aimed primarily at the plaintiff,
but rather at a third party.' 6 Yet, Article 2315.6 did not prevent recovery
because the courts found that the defendants owed direct, independent duties to
the plaintiffs. The question then, is whether Article 2315.6 can be avoided by
any plaintiff who is otherwise a bystander simply because they can prove the
defendant owes an independent duty of care to prevent the NIED.
The very language of Article 2315.6 contemplates a plaintiff who suffers
emotional distress "as a result of [an]other person's injury."' 27 By definition,
when the plaintiff suffers any injury, including mental distress unaccompanied
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id.
121. 692 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 695 So. 2d 1358 (1997).
122. Id. at 1291.
123. Maraist and Galligan, supra note 3, § 5-8, at 125.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 118 and 122.
125. Moresi v. State Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 110-122.
127. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6(A).
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by physical harm, that was caused by the defendant's breach of a duty of care
owed directly and independently to the plaintiff, the plaintiff suffers, not as a
result of another's injury, but as a result of her own injury. Furthermore, the
article's provision that expressly limits bystander NIED recovery exclusively to
Article 2315.6 also refers to "[d]amages suffered as a result of mental anguish
or emotional distress for injury to another ....",2 Thus, the wording of
Article 2315.6 expressly renders that article inapplicable to any case wherein the
defendant owes the plaintiff an independent, direct duty to prevent the NIED.
In dictum, Judge Carter, writing for the first circuit in Norred v. Radisson
Hotel Corporation, seems to adopt such an interpretation. 29 The court
disallowed an action under Article 2315.6 concluding the plaintiffs distress was
not sufficiently "severe and debilitating" to satisfy the article. 3 ' However, the
court then proceeded to analyze the facts under Moresi because "in order for
[plaintiff] to be entitled to damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
an independent, direct duty must have been owed to her by the defen-
dants . . . ,"" Though the court resolved this issue in the affirmative, it
nevertheless denied recovery because, again, the plaintiff did not prove the
resulting mental distress was "genuine and serious."' 32 Central to answering
the question posed above is not the ultimate denial of recovery, but rather the
court's methodology in assessing the claim under both Article 2315.6 and
Moresi, despite the fact that the plaintiff was a bystander in the classic sense.
3
Therefore, Norred stands for the proposition that where a bystander plaintiff
establishes an independent and direct duty owed to her by the defendant, an
NIED claim is not limited to disposition under Article 2315.6. In certain
situations, the positive law exception gives way to the jurisprudential general
rule. The importance of Norred should not be overstated since it is only one
case decided by one of the courts of appeal. On the other hand, Norred takes on
additional weight when the court's analysis in Clomon is viewed in the light of
basic civilian statutory interpretation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, after Moresi and Lejeune, but before the
Legislature enacted Article 2315.6, decided in Clomon that where the defendant
owes a statutory duty to the plaintiff to protect against NIED due to a third party
trauma victim, the Lejeune bystander recovery limitation test is inapplicable."'
Moreover, the exceptions to Lejeune's control of bystander NIED claims is not
128. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6(B).
129. 665 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995). The plaintiff alleged mental distress due to her
entry into the hotel room wherein her husband had previously been robbed.
130. Id. at 759.
131. Id. at 759-60.
132. Id. at 760.
133. The plaintiff came upon the scene of her husband's robbery shortly after it occurred. See
id. at 759.
134. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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limited to statutory duties owed the plaintiff, but extends to all direct and
independent duties. In Clomon, Justice Dennis, speaking for the court, stated:
Lejeune does not govern every class of claim for emotional damage due
to third party injury. Lejeune addressed only the most typical class, a
suit by a plaintiff emotionally distressed by his loved one's injury
against a tortfeasor based purely on a breach of the latter's general duty
of due care. In formulating rules to establish a guaranty of merit for
this broad class of claims, the Lejeune court did not intend to modify
or interrupt the development of rules or decisions permitting recovery
for emotional distress from a tortfeasor who owed the plaintiff a special,
direct duty created by law, contract or special relationship. 3
That Lejeune did not apply where the defendant owed the plaintiff a direct,
independent duty of care represented a jurisprudential precept underlying the
Lejeunejurisprudential rule. Given that this precept was specifically enunciated
in Clomon, it was at least tacitly approved by the legislature since Article 2315.6
did not in any way repudiate it. "[L]egislative approval and codification of a
broad, general jurisprudential principle carries with it approval of, or acquies-
cence in, contemporaneously developed auxiliary rules used by the courts to
implement the principle, unless there is a contrary provision."' 36 "To reach a
different conclusion would be to follow the common law tendency to restrict the
field of application of a statute as much as possible, rather than the traditional
civil law doctrine of implementing the law by interpretation and analogy."'3
That Article 2315.6 does not apply when there is an independent, direct duty
of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant is a straightforward and simple
concept. The difficulty lies in articulating those circumstances from which such
a duty arises. Another look at the California experience is instructive.
In a case decided just two weeks before rendering Thing v. La Chusa, the
California Supreme Court did not apply the type of limitations delineated in
Thing to a direct victim case.' "Instead, the court .. .allow[ed] plaintiffs
who did not meet the Thing prerequisites to recover based upon their special
relationship with the defendant."'3 9 The opinion did not "provide any guide-
lines to help the lower courts differentiate between bystanders and direct
victims."'4 In the same law review article, Professor Greenberg posited that
recovery in direct victim cases should be limited to those plaintiffs who are
135. Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 575 (La. 1990).
136. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (La. 1986).
137. Id. at 1199.
138. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). The court
allowed two mothers to recover for NIED from a therapist who had sexually abused their children.
See also Julie A. Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Consistent
Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders and Direct Victims, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 1283, 1288 (1992).
139. Greenberg, supra note 138, at 1288.
140. Id.
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particularly likely to suffer severe emotional harm in order to promote the
same societal policies underlying bystander recovery.' 4' She concluded
that a bright line test for direct, independent duties is required, and she
proposed a three-part test: first, the plaintiff or the trauma victim closely
related to the plaintiff must have a preexisting relationship with the
defendant; second, a primary purpose of this relationship must be to
protect the plaintiffs tranquility; and third, the plaintiff must suffer severe
emotional distress.
142
As Moresi provides for the third test it need not be considered further.
However, whether the existence of a direct duty can be fairly made to depend
upon a preexisting relationship between the parties is a dubious proposition. A
defendant will often be aware that his conduct will expose bystanders to serious
injury, but he may not know the particular person who is subsequently injured,
much less have a relationship with them. Yet, to conclude that such a defendant
owed no duty of care to the distress victim is to effectively turn a blind eye
towards his negligent conduct. Additionally, to entertain the query of whether
a defendant is in a particular relationship that has for one of its primary purposes
the object of protecting the plaintiffs emotional tranquility seems unworkable.
But the strength of this approach is apparent given that where it is satisfied, the
bystander was doubtlessly owed a direct duty of care by the tortfeasor to protect
against the distress. This is so because, as the California Supreme Court stated
in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, where the alleged tortious conduct of
the defendant was directed to the bystander as well as to the immediate victim,
both are direct victims.
43
In 1961, before Louisiana allowed any recovery for bystander NIED, the
First Circuit found such a direct duty in Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co. '44 The court found that the defendant exterminator owed plaintiff parents
a duty, both contractual and delictual, to know the ingredients of its poisons that
were ingested by the plaintiffs minor son so that timely, effective treatment
would be possible.' 4  "Defendant's duty in this regard, as well as plaintiffs'
correlative rights, are neither secondary, derivative nor dependent upon injury to
141. Id. at 1306.
142. Id. at 1310.
143. 616 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1980). The court allowed plaintiff husband to recover for
NIED where the defendant doctor negligently told the patient wife that she had contracted syphilis
and directed her to inform her husband.
144. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). For other cases pre-dating Lejeune wherein
courts found independent duties owed to distress victims whose anguish was caused by injury to a
third party, see Bishop v. Callais, 533 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d
1214 (1989); Skorlich v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985);
Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So. 2d 453 (La. App. Orl. 1954); Jordan v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 90 So.
2d 531 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); and Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La.
App. Orl. 1951).
145. 135 So. 2d 145, 158 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1961).
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a third party but on the contrary, are direct, primary and independent of an
alleged tort in relation to plaintiffs' son."' 4 The court went on to state:
We believe the foregoing views neither disturb nor deviate from the rule
obtaining in this state (to which this Court continues to adhere) to the
effect a plaintiff may not recover for mental pain and anguish occa-
sioned by injury to another. Excepted from said rule, however, are
those instances wherein a plaintiff suing for mental pain and anguish
occasioned by physical injury to another does so on the basis of a
breach of a primary legal duty and obligation owed by the defendant
directly to the plaintiff seeking such damages.'47
If such a result obtained at a time when there was no recovery for bystander
NIED claims, a fortiori Article 2315.6, which prescribes the parameters of
bystander NIED recovery, does not, absent an express provision to the contrary,
preclude recovery by similarly situated plaintiffs-those who suffer distress as
a result of another person's injury but where the tortfeasor breached a duty owed
directly and independently to the plaintiff to protect against the anguish.
Guidelines are required, however, to distinguish these direct and independent
duties so as to avoid merely following the standard foreseeability-basedduty-risk
analysis. Any scenario satisfying Moresi would involve a duty owed to the
plaintiff else no action would lie. The result would be that Moresi might
indicate a duty and thus preempt the application of Article 2315.6 in every case.
Clearly this is an outcome that neither the court nor the Legislature intend-
ed.14 s But to ensure that both Moresi and Article 2315.6 remain in their proper
position, one or the other should clearly spell out those circumstances in which
the defendant owes the plaintiff an independent, direct duty of care of a nature
such that Article 2315.6 is rendered inapplicable though the distress is otherwise
suffered by a bystander.
C. The Future of Moresi and Article 2315.6
Lejeune's avowed purpose was twofold: first, to declare that NIED claims
arising out of injury to third persons were valid under Article 2315 and duty-risk
principles; and, second, to modify and restrict these bystander claims so as to
limit tortfeasor exposure and ensure the mental anguish is genuine and
severe. 149 Recall that Moresi was crafted to do the same thing with respect to
NIED causes of action generally. 5 ' In allowing recovery in accordance with
Article 2315 so long as there are sufficient assurances that the claim is not
146. Id.
147. Id. at 158-59.
148. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 569-70 (La. 1990).
149. Id. at 569.
150. Moresi v. State Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990).
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spurious, and that it is based upon facts guaranteeing a genuine claim of serious
mental distress, Moresi's general rule is virtually indistinguishable in its purpose
from Lejeune's.
The Lejeune court itself recognized that its rule imposed "somewhat
arbitrary" restrictions on bystander NIED claims.' Moreover, the court drew
the line so as to "ensure that there is no open-ended exposure of tortfeasors, and
ensure as well that a policy of limited exposure to serious mental pain and
anguish damages sustained by a limited class of claimants will be permitted."'52
Thus, Lejeune was designed to achieve the same ends as was Moresi, but yields
more arbitrary and harsh results along the way.
It should not be surprising that when a bystander case yields a particularly
harsh and "arbitrary" result under Article 2315.6, the courts may feel compelled
to reach, a more equitable and just result by resorting to Moresi whenever
possible. Perhaps this is result-oriented decision-making by the courts; however,
considering Justice Dennis' explanation of the Lejeune opinion, the courts are
seemingly justified so long as there existed a direct, independent duty in favor
of the plaintiff.53
The larger problem is that such result-oriented decisions seem inconsistent
not only with Lejeune as a jurisprudential rule, but also with Article 2315.6-a
positive law restriction on bystander NIED claims which, by its very language,
affords no exception. Thus, the question is not whether the two (Article 2315.6
and Moresi) are in conflict, they are, but how should the conflict be resolved.
The answer largely depends upon whether Article 2315.6 is rightly regarded
as the mere codification of Lejeune as explained by Justice Dennis, or whether
Article 2315.6 is complete in itself such that courts may not fairly look beyond
its language in effecting its interpretation. Obviously, if Article 2315.6 is
nothing more than a legislative enactment of Lejeune which preserves the court's
intent, then courts are perfectly justified in resorting to Moresi where there exists
an independent duty owed directly to the plaintiff by the defendant, despite the
fact that Article 2315.6 is otherwise controlling.
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 9, "[w]hen a law is clear and unambigu-
ous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the
intent of the legislature." Thus, a court's justification for not limiting bystander
NIED claims to the provisions of Article 2315.6 when the article is squarely on
point may turn on the absurdity of the result. Particularly, as stated earlier,
where application of Article 2315.6 yields a harsh and "arbitrary" result that is
readily corrected by resort to Moresi, courts may be justified in doing so.
However, given that the legislature had full benefit of the California experience
which had revealed that bystander NIED claims were especially prone to being
151. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 569.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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spurious and to result in unlimited liability for damages only remotely foresee-
able,'54 a harsh result obtained under Article 2315.6 seems to more fairly
represent a considered possibility and not an absurdity. In simple terms, such
results are costs to society in terms of fairness that, in the collective mind of the
legislature, are outweighed by the benefits of limited liability within carefully
defined parameters serving to prevent many spurious claims and to promote
judicial efficiency.
In at least one case, Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, the
fourth circuit refused to allow recovery to a step-mother who witnessed an
injury-causing accident in which her step-son was a trauma victim. 5 Finding
that Article 2315.6 applied and that "mother" included only biological or
adoptive mothers, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her claim. 5 6
Though it did not specifically address the issue, the court likely did not find such
result to be absurd. In fact, the court employed Article 9 to conclude that, as
used in Article 2315.6, "mother" is clear and unambiguous such that it cannot be
read to include a step-mother.' 57 Indeed, this case may be one of those
arbitrary and harsh results. Given that the plaintiff was the trauma victim's only
mother figure since he was three years old,5 ' a distinct possibility exists that
a detailed, fact specific inquiry would reveal a guarantee that the claim was not
spurious, and that the mental distress was both genuine and severe. In short,
though the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Article 2315.6, the opposite
result would likely obtain under Moresi. If so, the ultimate question is whether
the cost in fairness and equity denied to the plaintiff were truly compensated for
by any real benefit to society as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Recapitulation of the Current Status of NIED as a Cause of Action
Currently, Louisiana recognizes an independent cause of action for NIED as
articulated in Moresi. The only exception to this jurisprudential rule is Article
2315.6 that governs bystander recovery through its enhanced safeguards against
spurious claims and unlimited recovery-concerns that are substantially more
warranted in the bystander context. However, where the tortfeasor owes an
independent, direct duty to the bystander NIED victim, a reasonable argument
can be made that the claim is evaluated under Moresi and not under Article
2315.6.
154. See supra text accompanying note 86.
155. 663 So. 2d 840, 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 1085 (1996).
156. Id. at 841.
157. Id.
158. See id.
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B. Resolving the Hypothetical
The hypothetical posed in the introduction was a hybrid of Lejeune and
Daigrepont.'59 In Lejeune, Chief Justice Calogero did not specify the relational
proximity required between the plaintiff and the trauma victim, saying only that
whatever standard is to be adopted, "Mrs. Lejeune, the wife of the directly
injured victim, qualifies."'" Furthermore, the court refused to indicate whether
that standard might include only close relatives by blood and marriage or all
claimants having a close relationship with the victim.'6' Since the issue was
clearly resolved by the Legislature in the language of Article 2315.6(A), 162 this
would be a moot point before any court that would follow Daigrepont in
steadfastly applying the article, despite its seemingly harsh and arbitrary results.
Under this approach, the victim would not state a valid NIED cause of action.
Though Moresi would likely be satisfied, the governing rule of law would be
Article 2315.6 that denies recovery to step-mothers.
However, if a court considering the hypothetical determined either that this
language yielded an absurd result, or, more likely, that the defendant hospital
owed the step-mother an independent, direct duty to protect her against such
mental anguish, then it should employ the Moresi standard instead. For example,
if the facts were such that the step-mother had taken the step-son to the hospital
initially and had contracted for his medical care, the hospital would owe her a
direct, independent duty and Article 2315.6 would be rendered inapplicable.
In Daigrepont, the plaintiff did not argue that there was such a duty, and as
a result, the court did not comment on how it would resolve the issue.'63 But,
as made clear in Clomon, Guillory, and Norred, were the plaintiff to plead and
subsequently prove such a duty, the court might well apply Moresi.'64
C. Recommendations
Prosser and Keeton suggest that the bystander proximity doctrine and an
independent NIED cause of action may be incompatible: "How far the rule of
[the bystander proximity doctrine] may ultimately spread, and whether it may
even one day be swallowed up in the newly emerging 'independent' cause of
action for emotional distress, remain for now unanswered questions in this
tumultuous area of the law."' 6" Indeed this insight seems correct given that the
two will almost certainly conflict, and that with the built in limitations of the
159. See supra note 12.
160. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990).
161. Id. at 570-71.
162. See supra note 59.
163. Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 663 So. 2d 840, 840-41 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1996).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 58, and 129.
165. Keeton et al., supra note 14, § 54, at 366-67.
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general cause of action, a more restrictive bystander approach seems not only
unnecessary, but is certain to yield harsh and arbitrary results incongruous with
those that would otherwise obtain under the general rule. The only valid reason
to have both rules is to prevent a flood of unjustified litigation that would
otherwise occur if only the general rule were in place. However, where the
general rule contains adequate restrictions to safeguard against such excesses,
there simply is such minimal utility in having a bystander proximity rule that its
costs to fairness may overwhelm any small contribution it provides.
If one were to contrast the likely divergent results to be obtained in applying
Article 2315.6 and Moresi to the hypothetical fact pattern solely in the context
of whether fairness will permit the loss to be sustained by the innocent mental
anguish victim, the Moresi test yields the better result. Moresi is only preferable
to Article 2315.6, however, if the litigation floodgates are not opened too widely
for bystander NIED claims. Thus, the matter turns on the nature of the
safeguards contained within Moresi. They seem adequate to the task and, in fact,
only slightly more relaxed than those in Article 2315.6. Whether the Legislature
should repeal Article 2315.6 is fairly debatable. What seems clear, however, is
that either the court or the Legislature should inform the law as to what
constitutes direct and independent duties of care such that plaintiffs otherwise
denied recovery by Article 2315.6 can instead invoke the Moresi general NIED
test. Currently courts are left to an "I will know it when I see it" approach that
defeats consistency and fails to put society on adequate notice of the rules
governing NIED.
John B. Edwards
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